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Appellees Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc ("Marriott"). Shari Levitin, 
Tom Messina, Brent Ferrin, and Peter Gatch jointly submit this brief. Appellees are 
collectively referred to as "Defendants." 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the Order Granting Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment entered August 26, 1996, by Judge Pat B. Brian, Third Judicial 
District Court Judge, Summit County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-3(3)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellant Cassedy Stien has raised the following issues for review: 
1. Whether Ms. Stien can state a claim for "appropriation of name or 
likeness" even though she did not appear in the videotape at issue in this case and neither 
her name nor likeness were disclosed to the public. Preserved at R. 113-14, 248-50. 
2. Whether Ms. Stien can state a claim for "public disclosure of 
private facts" even though the videotape at issue did not convey actual fact, but was 
instead mere opinion, in the form of a joke or spoof. Preserved at R. 113-14, 248-49. 
3. Whether Ms. Stien can state a claim for "false light" publicity even 
though she was not identified nor depicted on the videotape at issue, and even though the 
videotape obviously was a joke or spoof. Preserved at R. 113-14; 250-51. 
4. Whether Ms. Stien can state a claim for "intrusion upon seclusion" 
even though the videotape at issue did not convey actual fact and even though there was 
no spatial intrusion on Ms. Stien's private life. Preserved at R. 111-12. 
242\138044 1 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The factual issues in this case are undisputed. [Appellant's Br. at 3-4]. 
This Court therefore reviews the trial court's decision under a correction of error standard. 
See Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank. 919 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1996). 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
There are no statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative of the issues raised in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a videotape, depicting various Marriott employees, that 
was shown at a Marriott Christmas party. Approximately fifteen people, including Ms. 
Stien's husband Brad Bauman, were asked on camera to describe a distasteful household 
chore. The audio was then changed to make it appear as if the employees were answering 
the question, "What is sex like with your partner?" Mr. Bauman appeared in the video, 
but was not identified by name. Ms. Stien did not appear in the video nor was she 
identified by name. 
Ms. Stien has sued Marriott, and several individuals allegedly responsible 
for creating the videotape, for invasion of privacy. Ms. Stien's claims, however, fail as a 
matter of law. Ms. Stien does not contend that those who viewed the videotape believed 
that the employees were describing what sex was like with their partners, or that her 
husband actually was describing his own sex life. Instead, she readily admits that the 
videotape was a joke or spoof. 
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B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On or about July 17, 1995, Ms. Stien and Mr. Bauman filed a complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah. [R. 1-8]. Mr. 
Bauman and Ms. Stien alleged causes of action under the four branches of the tort of 
invasion of privacy; appropriation of name or likeness, public disclosure of private facts, 
false light, and intrusion upon seclusion. Id Mr. Bauman later withdrew voluntarily 
from the lawsuit. [R. 331]. 
On or about April 10, 1996, Ms. Levitin filed a motion for summary 
judgment seeking dismissal of all claims raised in the Complaint. [R. 92-116]. Marriott 
joined Ms. Levitin's motion [R. 118-48], and Ms. Stien stipulated that the trial court's 
ruling would apply to the remaining Defendants. [R. 257]. Following oral argument, that 
included a review of the videotape in question, the Third Judicial District Court granted 
the motion and dismissed all claims raised in the Complaint. [R. 331]. The Order 
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment was entered by the Court on August 26, 
1996. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Addendum A. [R. 332-37]. 
The Court found that the videotape did not name Mr. Bauman or Ms. 
Stien, nor did it identify either of them by job position, job title, or employment task. [R. 
334]. The Court also found that the videotape did not purport to inform viewers of the 
participants' actual sexual experiences with their partners, that there was no serious 
connotation regarding any of the participants' actual sexual conduct, and, instead, the 
video was nothing more than an effort at humor. Id. 
Based upon these findings, the Court concluded: 
242\138044 1 
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1. No reasonable person could possibly view the videotape as 
anything other than a joke or spoof, or conclude that the tape was a factual 
statement about plaintiffs private life; 
2. Although the videotape may have been in poor taste, it did 
not invade Ms. Stien's privacy rights; 
3. The videotape is not reasonably capable of conveying the 
offensive meaning or innuendo described by Ms. Stien as the basis for her 
invasion of privacy claims; 
4. The videotape did not convey actual fact; it constitutes 
mere opinion in the form of a joke or spoof, and thus may not predicate a 
claim for false light or invasion of privacy; and 
5. There are no genuine disputes as to any material facts and 
the defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all 
claims for relief. 
[R. 334-35]. 
On September 25, 1996, Ms. Stien filed a Notice of Appeal. [R. 347-49]. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. At all times relevant to this action, Ms. Stien and Mr. Bauman 
were husband and wife and Mr. Bauman was employed with Marriott. [R. 8-9]. 
2. The videotape in question was displayed at a Christmas party for 
Marriott employees and their guests on December 10, 1994. [R. at 36]. 
3. In the videotape, Mr. Bauman and the other individuals were asked 
to describe a distasteful household chore. [R. at 117, 333]. 
242\ 138044 1 
4 
4. The videotape subsequently was edited to make it appear as if 
these individuals were answering the question, 4wWhat is sex like with your partner?" Mr. 
Bauman's statements on the videotape are as follows: 
The smell, the smell, the smell. And then you go with the goggles. You 
have to put on the goggles. And then you get the smell through the nose. 
And as you get into it things start flying all over the place. And the smell. 
And you get covered in these things. 
But the smell gets worse and then it gets worse and then it gets worse. 
And then your biggest problem is you forget to remove this smell from the 
house and then you leave it there and then you come back and your wife 
uncovers the smell. 
And you have to do it and you have to enjoy doing it. And you can't you 
can't get into the idea that this is something that you don't want to do. 
But I've found that the goggles work very well because eye protection is a 
very important thing. 
[R. at 117,33s].1 
The cited portions of the videotape constitute the entirety of Mr. Bauman's statements in the videotape. 
The ellipses signal portions of the videotape where other participants are speaking. Defendants urge the 
Court to view the brief videotape in order to learn its content, context, and tone. Defendants believe that 
such a review is necessary to see how the trial court arrived at its decision. 
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5. The videotape was intended to be a spoof or joke and does not 
portray actual facts, events, or interviews. None of the individuals shown on the video 
was actually describing their sexual activities or any other private information. [R. at 
206, 333]. 
6. The videotape is approximately six minutes in length and contains 
brief excerpts from over 15 individuals. Mr. Bauman is the second person who appears 
on the video, and he appears four more times throughout the video. His name is never 
used. [R. 117,333]. 
7. Ms. Stien does not appear in the video. She is never mentioned by 
name or otherwise identified, either by Mr. Bauman or by any other participant. [R. 117, 
334]. 
8. The videotape was not used to promote or sponsor Marriott nor 
was it instructional in nature. [R. 117, 334]. 
9. The videotape did not contain any serious connotation regarding 
any of the participants actual sexual conduct. Instead, the videotape was nothing more 
than an effort at humor. [R. 117, 334]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly determined that Ms. Stien cannot state a claim for 
invasion,of privacy because no reasonable viewer would believe that it conveyed true 
facts about Ms. Stien's sex life. The videotape obviously was a spoof on the subject of 
"what sex is like" with various, unnamed "partners." Moreover, it is undisputed that 
videotape did not depict Ms. Stien, either by name, image, or likeness and the videotape 
was not used for commercial purposes. The videotape also did not describe private facts 
concerning Ms. Stien or her husband and it was not highly offensive to a reasonable 
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person. Finally, the sexual innuendo allegedly contained in the videotape, carried on in a 
public setting, did not amount to an actual intrusion upon Ms. Stien's seclusion. 
ARGUMENT 
A. DEFENDANTS DID NOT APPROPRIATE MS. STIEN'S 
NAME OR LIKENESS FOR THEIR BENEFIT. 
The elements of the appropriation-of-name-or-likeness branch of invasion 
of privacy are as follows: (1) appropriation; (2) for one's own use or benefit; and (3) of 
the name or likeness of another. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563-64 (Utah 1988); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977). Ms. Stien concedes that neither her name 
nor her likeness was shown in the videotape. In fact, in her brief she candidly admits that 
her argument is "complicated by the fact that she is not mentioned by name in the video 
nor is she shown." [Appellant Br. at 12]. Even assuming that Ms. Stien could somehow 
show an "appropriation" of her name or likeness, her argument must fail because any 
such "appropriation" would have been merely incidental, and Ms. Stien cannot establish 
that there was any intrinsic value to the use of her name or likeness, or that Defendants 
obtained any benefit from such use. See Cox, 761 P.2d at 564-65. 
In Cox, the Utah Supreme Court examined plaintiffs' claims for 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and abuse of personal identity. Id at 557. The case 
stemmed from a photograph taken of the plaintiffs with Senator Hatch, which was used as 
part of a political advertisement. The trial court dismissed the claims and the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs could not state a claim based upon 
appropriation of name or likeness under section 652C of Restatement of Torts, or under 
242\138044.1 
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Utah's abuse of personal identity statute. Id. at 564 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 45-3-3 
(1993)).2 
In Cox, unlike the instant case, the plaintiffs actually appeared in the 
allegedly offensive publication, and, in addition, the publication was used in a political 
advertisement. The court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs failed to show that their 
names or likenesses had any intrinsic value that the defendants appropriated. The court 
explained that intrinsic value cannot be established "just because the defendants may 
have obtained some benefit by using the plaintiffs' likenesses when the benefit is the 
same as defendants would have had from using the likeness of a number of other 
[individuals]." Id at 564. 
In this case, Ms. Stien claims that the videotape was shown at an event 
that had a commercial purpose. Even if a company Christmas party can have such a 
purpose, such an assertion is insufficient to satisfy the elements of Ms. Stien's privacy 
claim. Any imputation of Ms. Stien's name or likeness in the videotape, because she was 
not named or shown, was merely incidental. Any benefit obtained by Defendants would 
have been "the same as defendants would have had from using [the name or] the 
likeness" of anyone other than Ms. Stien. As in Cox, in this case the videotape was not 
used to appropriate any value that Ms. Stien's name or likeness may have had. The 
videotape was intended as a joke, and that joke would have its intended effect regardless 
Ms. Stien has not raised a statutory claim, presumably because the Utah statute requires that the 
prohibited use must involve an advertisement in which there is an implication that the claimant endorses or 
approves of the advertised subject matter. Under Utah's former statute, Utah Code Ann., § 76-4-8 (1953), 
an action could lie for use of a person's name, portrait or picture "for advertising purposes or for purposes 
of trade." That broader purpose was consistent with the historic development of a statutory cause of action 
for invasion of privacy. See generally, W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §117, 
at 850-54 (5th ed. 1984). 
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of who was featured which is, in fact, what happened with the other people displayed in 
the videotape. 
Where the use of a person's name or likeness is merely incidental, there 
can be no recovery for appropriation of name or likeness. "The incidental use of a 
person's name or likeness is not, as a matter of law, actionable as an appropriation of a 
person's name or likeness under the Restatement or the Utah statute." Cox, 761 P.2d at 
565. The Court in Cox relied on a Massachusetts case, Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly 
Co., 400 N.E.2d 847 (1980), wherein the court distinguished 
between situations in which the defendant makes an incidental use of the 
plaintiffs name, portrait or picture and those in which the defendant uses the 
plaintiffs name, portrait or picture deliberately to exploit its value for advertising 
or trade purposes. 
Id. at 850. Ms. Stien has failed to present any evidence that Defendants deliberately 
exploited her name or likeness for advertising or trade purposes. 
Unlike Cox, the videotape at issue in this case did not identify Ms. Stien, 
either by name or by likeness. There was at most an indirect reference to her as the 
partner of an unnamed individual who appeared on the videotape (an individual who has 
chosen not to pursue a claim in this case)/ The only way a viewer could identify Ms. 
Throughout Ms. Stien's brief, she refers to the employer/employee relationship and argues that this 
Court should not permit employers to treat kiempioyee[s] as a chattel whose legal and moral duty includes 
entertaining the employer." [Appellant's Br. at 6-7]. It is undisputed, however, that there is no 
employment relationship between Ms. Stien and any of the Defendants. Moreover, although there was an 
employment relationship between Mr. Bauman and Marriott, Mr. Bauman has chosen not to pursue any 
claims against Defendants, presumably because he does not have any faith in their merit. In any event, Ms. 
Stien's arguments about employer/employee relationships have no bearing on this case and this Court 
should disregard them. 
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Stien is if the viewer knew Mr. Bauman by sight, and had independent knowledge that 
Ms. Stien was his wife. 
A similarly attenuated relationship was held to be insufficient to sustain a 
claim for relief in Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 57 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N. Y. 1944), 
which involved the film Yankee Doodle Dandy, a fictionalized account of the life of 
George M. Cohan. Mr. Cohan's first wife brought a lawsuit claiming damages for 
invasion of privacy. The suit was brought pursuant to the New York state statute which 
provided that damages could be recovered for injury from the use of a person's name, 
portrait, or picture for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade in the absence of 
consent. Id. at 40.4 The actress playing Mrs. Cohan in the film bore no resemblance to 
the plaintiff and had a different first name; furthermore, there was no mention in the film 
of the fact that Cohan had had more than one wife. The court in Levey dismissed the 
complaint, holding that "the motion picture does not sufficiently portray or picture the 
plaintiff to justify the conclusion that the defendant violated any right of privacy afforded 
her by the Civil Right Law." Id. at 42. Similarly, in this case there is no basis for 
concluding that Ms. Stien's name or likeness was appropriated by Defendants for their 
use or benefit, and the trial court properly dismissed Ms. Stien's claim. 
Although these claims were based on a state statute, the elements of this statutory claim are similar to the 
elements of a common law claim for appropriation of name or likeness, as alleged by Ms. Stien in this 
case. 
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B. DEFENDANTS DID NOT PUBLICLY DISCLOSE PRIVATE 
FACTS ABOUT MS. STIEN. 
Section 652D of the Restatement recognizes a cause of action for 
"publicity given to private life." See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). To 
state a claim under this branch of invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show that (1) 
publicity was given, (2) to a private affair; (3) which would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. Id. This section of the Restatement provides "tort liability . . . for 
publicity given to true statements of fact." Id at 383 (emphasis added). The purpose of 
the section is to allow recovery where some personal piece of true information, which is 
not of legitimate concern to the public (such as a photo "of a pair in a hotel room in a 
state of dishabbile"), is published or made public. Id. at 386-87. Nothing in this section 
of the Restatement suggests that recovery is proper where the publicized information is 
not true. 
Ms. Stien's claim for public disclosure of private facts cannot succeed 
because there was no disclosure of any information regarding Ms. Stien's private affairs. 
Her husband responded to a question regarding a household chore. [Appellant' Br. at 4]. 
He was not speaking about his sex life with Ms. Stien, therefore to the extent his 
statements on the video suggest that he disliked having sex with his wife, those 
statements were not true and were not intended to be taken as true by viewers of the 
video. In other words, the videotape did not convey actual facts. See Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2-3 (Addendum A). 
Although Ms. Stien admits that the publicized statements were not a true 
description of her husband's feelings about having sex with her, and although she 
acknowledges that distasteful household chores are not private affairs, she nevertheless 
seeks recovery for disclosure of private facts. Ms. Stien acknowledges there are no Utah 
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cases discussing this branch of invasion of privacy and therefore relies upon the 
Restatement. Her application of section 652D, however, is erroneous. This section 
plainly states that it is intended to provide relief when true facts are published and those 
facts would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Ms. Stien cannot meet this 
standard. 
Ms. Stien also cannot meet her burden of establishing that the disclosures 
made on the tape were highly offensive to a reasonable person. The trial court viewed the 
videotape and found they were not as a matter of law. The trial court, after viewing the 
videotape, found that no reasonable person could possibly view the videotape as anything 
other than a joke or conclude that the video contained factual statements about Ms. 
Stien's private affairs. The court stated, "[t]he videotape is not reasonably capable of 
conveying the offensive meaning or the innuendo described by [Ms. Stien] as the basis 
for her invasion of privacy claim." Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, at 3 (Addendum A). The trial court properly dismissed Ms. Stien's claim for 
disclosure of private facts, and this Court should affirm that ruling. 
C. DEFENDANTS DID NOT PLACE MS. STIEN IN A FALSE 
LIGHT. 
To state a claim for false light invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show 
that the defendant (1) gave publicity to a matter concerning the plaintiff, (2) that places 
the plaintiff before the public in a false light, (3) the false light in which the plaintiff was 
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (4) the defendant knew that 
the plaintiff would be placed in a false light, or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the 
publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff was placed. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652E (1977). 
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The trial court viewed the videotape at the hearing on the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment and determined that it could not rationally be considered 
to convey actual facts about the participants' sex lives or those of their unnamed partners. 
[R. 333]. The court explained: 
There was no serious connotation regarding any of the participants' actual 
sexual conduct.... No reasonable person could possibly view the 
videotape as anything other than a joke or spoof, or conclude that the tape 
was a factual statement about plaintiffs private life. 
[R. 333]. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment on Ms. Stien's claim 
for false light invasion of privacy. [R. at 333-34]. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the videotape did not place Ms. 
Stien in a false light on the basis that no reasonable viewer would treat the videotape as a 
serious commentary on her sex life, or any other private matters. While the tort of false 
light invasion of privacy generally protects individuals from falsehoods made public, if a 
statement cannot reasonably be taken as fact, as with the edited statements in the 
videotape about sex with "partners," the statement does not amount to false light invasion 
of privacy because the public does not receive a false impression of that individual. In 
other words, "there is no cause of action for false light invasion of privacy if the 
statement obviously purports to be fictitious." Restatement (Second) of Torts §652E, 
cmt. a (1981 Appendix) (citing Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978)). 
In Walko v. Kean College of New Jersey, 561 A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. 
1988), a college administrator sued the college for false light invasion of privacy arising 
from a spoof edition of the school newspaper identifying the plaintiff as a person 
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available for "good telephone sex." The court extended the holding in Hustler Magazine 
v. FalwelK 486 U.S. 496 (1988), that one cannot recover for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress for publication of a caricature without showing a false statement of 
fact, to the plaintiffs action for false light invasion of privacy. The court determined that 
the parody did not contain a false statement of fact because no reasonable reader would 
interpret the parody as a serious portrayal of actual facts and granted summary judgment 
in defendant's favor. Walko, 561 A.2d at 687-88; see also Salek v. Passaic Collegiate 
School, 605 A.2d 276, 279 (N.J. Super. 1992) (with false light invasion tort, judge must 
decide legal question of "whether the criticized matter is capable of the meaning assigned 
to it by plaintiff); Fudge v. Penthouse International, Ltd.. 840 F.2d 1012, 1019-20 (1st 
Cir.) (photograph of young girls obtained from Associated Press and reprinted in news 
section of pornography magazine did not place subjects in false light; photograph not 
reasonably capable of implying endorsement as a matter of law), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 
821 (1988); Pring v. Penthouse International. Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 441-442 (10th Cir. 
1982) (sexual parody that could not be taken literally by reasonable reader and therefore 
did not cast plaintiff in false light), cert, denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). 
Ms. Stien does not challenge on appeal the trial court's conclusion that no 
reasonable viewer would consider the videotape a serious account of her sex life. Her 
main complaint with the trial court's ruling is that the caselaw cited by the defendants 
deals with "press related cases with public figures"5 and is therefore inapposite. 
5
 Ms. Stien's contention that she is not a public figure is curious in light of contradictory allegations in her 
Complaint: 
Plaintiff Cassedy Stien is a two-time world champion skier that [sic] has professionally endorsed 
products for competition and which [sic] has a professional image and reputation recognized by 
those within the ski industry generally and Park City, Utah specifically. 
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[Appellant's Br. at 15]. Actually, Salek v. Passaic Collegiate School Fudge v. Penthouse 
International Ltd., and Pring v. Penthouse International Ltd., all deal with private 
plaintiffs. Furthermore, the court in Pring rejected the plaintiffs argument that the 
inquiry of whether the offending material "could be reasonably understood as describing 
actual facts about the plaintiff should only apply to public figures. Pring, 695 F.2d at 
442. Regardless of whether Ms. Stien is a public or private figure, the dispositive 
inquiry, and the conclusion that the videotape cannot credibly be termed a serious 
commentary on Ms. Stien's sex life, remain the same. 
Ms. Stien's only other fault with the trial court's ruling is her belief that it 
"amounts to saying as long as employees make the employers laugh, employees have no 
protected privacy right."6 [Appellant's Br. at 15]. The trial court did not rule, and the 
defendants have never suggested, that the test for a false light invasion of privacy claim is 
whether the criticized matter is funny.7 Rather, a cause of action arises if the criticized 
matter publicizes false facts in such a manner that they appear true to the reasonable 
viewer. That is not the case here as was found by the trial court. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that the videotape does not 
violate Ms. Stien's privacy by placing her in a false light. The reasonable viewer would 
[R. 4]. Ms. Stien confirmed her public status through responses to written discovery by producing her 
resume, stating that she had appeared in skiing films, and providing newspaper articles discussing her 
skiing achievements. [R.185]. 
6
 Ms. Stien cites Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635 P.2d 657 (Or. App. 1981), in which the Oregon Court of 
Appeals determined that the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to reach a jury on her cause of action 
for outrageous conduct, arising from a "strip search" while she was employed at K-Mart. The plaintiff did 
not allege that the strip search placed her in a false light, nor did she maintain that the strip search 
otherwise violated her privacy rights, so it is difficult to guess what relevance Bodewig has to this appeal. 
Again, it is undisputed that Ms. Stien was not an employee of any of the Defendants and it is therefore 
difficult to understand her continued reliance on an employment relationship as a basis for a right of 
privacy. 
242\ 138044 1 
15 
recognize the videotape as a spoof instead of a truthful and serious factual commentary 
on Ms. Stien's private affairs. 
D. DEFENDANTS DID NOT INTRUDE UPON MS. STIEN'S 
SECLUSION. 
While the authorities on the issue of intrusion upon seclusion are scarce, 
those authorities are in total harmony as to two elements which must be clearly shown. 
In order to sustain the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, Ms. Stien must show: (1) that 
there was an intentional, substantial, and actual intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon 
her seclusion; and (2) that such intrusion would be highly offensive to the reasonable 
person. See Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). Ms. Stien's argument fails on both counts. 
In the first instance, the videotape in question did not and could not rise to 
the level of an actual and substantial intrusion into or upon the life of Ms. Stien. The 
cases which have focused upon the issue of the nature of the intrusion itself have 
concluded that something far more tangible than the oblique reference in the videotape 
must have occurred in order for an intrusion to be found. For example, in Haehn v. City 
of Hoisington, 702 F. Supp. 1526 (D. Kan. 1988), the court ruled that sexual comments 
and brief touching did not amount to a claim of invasion of privacy. Specifically, in 
discussing the intrusion upon seclusion tort as found in Section 652B of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, the court stated: 
Intrusion upon Seclusion have focused on two factors: whether 
there has been an intentional interference in the solitude or 
seclusion of a person's physical being, or a prying into his or her 
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private affairs or concerns, and whether the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
Id. atl531. 
The court analyzed the issue of what kinds of acts are considered to be 
intrusive enough to merit application of the tort. In this analysis, the court, by 
illustration, noted the kinds of intrusion to which the tort is fashioned: 
Several cases are illustrative: installation of an electronic listening 
device in a tenant's bedroom, [citation omitted]; taking pictures 
and peeking through windows with binoculars, [citation omitted]; 
unauthorized prying into the plaintiffs bank account, [citation 
omitted]. 
Id. at 1531. 
The alleged intrusion in this case did not involve Ms. Stien at all. She was 
not named nor was any act or anecdote relating to her private life ever described. In 
short, there was never, to any reasonable mind, an intrusion of any kind. 
The second part of the analysis is that the intrusion must be "highly 
offensive to a reasonable person." Again, it was readily apparent to the trial court, and 
would be readily apparent to anyone else looking at the video, that it was intended to be a 
joke. There was no intent to intrude upon anyone's private life. There was no description 
of any particular act or aspect of Ms. Stien's private life. The video could be considered 
nothing more than an attempt at humor. The trial court was correct in concluding that 
this attempt at humor did not rise to the level of being highly offensive in the same way 
that an actual intrusion upon one's private affairs would be highly offensive. 
This Court, in Turner, recognized that the intrusion complained of must be 
outrageous or shocking in order to meet the standard of "highly offensive." In 
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commenting, in that case, upon the supposed intrusion, the Court noted that there was no 
evidence that the complainant was harassed or annoyed in the course of the supposed 
investigation which the complainant claimed to be intrusive. Turner, 832 P.2d at 67 n.8. 
The acts complained of in this case are neither intrusive nor highly 
offensive. No other conclusion can be drawn from the evidence. The trial court viewed 
the only evidence on that issue and correctly ruled that the privacy of Ms. Stien was not 
breached. That ruling should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on Ms. Stien's 
invasion of privacy claims. The subject matter of the videotape did not involve private or 
sensitive information. The individuals were describing household chores. While the 
videotape was dubbed to make it appear that the individuals were discussing their sex 
life, it was clear to all viewers that the sex lives were not being discussed and that the 
videotape was a spoof or joke. 
Neither Ms. Stien's likeness nor her name were appropriated. She is not 
shown on the video and her name is never mentioned. In fact, while her husband was 
shown on the video, even he was not identified by name. Any possible indirect reference 
to Ms. Stien was merely incidental. The videotape was an attempt at humor and 
entertainment and it was not made for the purpose of financial exploitation. Under these 
circumstances, there is no invasion of privacy. Defendants respectfully ask this Court to 
affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment. 
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DATED this \\V* day of February, 1997. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Marriott Ownership 
Resorts, Inc. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By:JA L O/^ 
E. Tibbitts 
flianne R. Blanch 
Attorneys for Shari Levitin 
Attorney for Peter Gatch 
l^Jr^A^^i 
JAsepa T// Huggins 
attorney for Tom Messina 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
B tr 
CameroivS. Dennings 
Attorneys for Brent Ferrin 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing JOINT BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be mailed, postage prepaid, thisTfaday of 
February, 1997, to the following: 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Sandra L. Steinvoort 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
242M38044 1 
20 
ADDENDUM 
242U38044 3 
No._ 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Bryon J. Benevento (5254) 8V-
Matthew M. Durham (6214) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
F I I E O 
CiefKOt Summit County 
Deputy Cleft 
& 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD BAUMAN and CASSEDY 
STIEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP RESORTS, 
INC., SHARI LEVITIN, TOM 
MESSINA, BRENT FERRIN and 
PETER GATCH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950300087 PI 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came before 
this Court for oral argument on Monday, July 22, 1996. The 
Honorable Pat B. Brian presided. Plaintiff was represented by 
Gregory J. Sanders. Defendant Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. 
was represented by Bryon J. Benevento. Defendant Shari Levitin 
was represented by Ryan E. Tibbitts. Defendant Brent Ferrin 
was represented by Duane R. Smith. Defendant Peter Gatch was 
QTJWM »T DA£C n •"> r\ 
represented by Janet A. Goldstein. Defendant Tom Messina was 
represented by Joseph J. Huggins. 
The Court marked and received into evidence the 
videotape in question. Based upon the review of the videotape, 
the supporting and opposing memoranda, oral argument of 
counsel, and for other good cause appearing thereon; 
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, for purposes of this motion, 
as follows: 
1. The videotape in question was shown at a 
Christmas party for entertainment purposes. There were 
approximately 200 people present at the party, including Brad 
Bauman and Cassedy Stien. 
2. The videotape is approximately six (6) minutes 
in length and contains brief excerpts of approximately fifteen 
individuals, including Brad Bauman. The individuals on the 
videotape were asked to describe a distasteful household chore. 
The audio was then changed to make it appear uhat the 
individuals were answering a question of what sex was like with 
their partners. 
3. Due to the nature of the original question, none 
of the individuals actually described their sexual activities 
or any other private information. 
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4. The videotape was not used to promote or sponsor 
Marriott Ownership Resorts, nor was it instructional in nature. 
5. The videotape did not name Brad Bauman or 
Cassedy Stien, nor did it identify them by job position, job 
title or employment task. 
6. The videotape did not purport to inform the 
viewer of the participants' actual sexual experiences with 
their partners. There was no serious connotation regarding any 
of the participants' actual sexual conduct. Instead, the 
videotape was nothing more than an effort at humor. 
ACCORDINGLY, THE COURT CONCLUDES as follows: 
1. No reasonable person could possibly view the 
videotape as anything other than a joke or spoof, or conclude 
that the tape was a factual statement about plaintiff's private 
life. 
2. While the videotape may have been in poor taste, 
it did not invade plaintiff's privacy rights. 
3. The videotape is not reasonably capable of 
conveying the offensive meaning or the innuendo described by 
plaintiff as the basis for her invasion of privacy claim. 
4. The videotape did not convey actual facts, it 
constituted mere opinion in the form of a joke or spoof, and 
thus may not predicate a claim for false light or invasion of privacy. 
196X110221 1 3 
5. There are no genuine disputes as to any material 
facts on these issues, and defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law on all claims for relief plead by 
plaintiff. 
THEREFORE, this Court grants defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment against plaintiff. 
DATED this.^X^ day of August, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
<7^& / ?= Honorable Pau~-D. DrijSn 
District Court Jud< 
Approved as to form: 
KIPP Sc CHRISTIAN 
\date 
Gregory tSandej?s 
Attorney -for plaintij " plaintiff s 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
r 
C ^ V ^ 
.M^1'4' 
Y/^/^Xdate /U (<T ^j. 
RVari El T*ibbits ! <^ \ 
Attbrn&y for defendant Shari Levitin 
Janet A. Goldstein 
Attorney for defendant Peter Gatch 
\date % H p P 
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DART,/ADAMS®N & D 
. Smith ' / 
,,,,,,,_. date 
Dua: 
Attorney for/defendant Brent Ferrin 
/ 
/ 
/ 
^ \date 
Joseph/ JZ Hug^ itts 
Attorney BOOT defendant Tom Messina 
- trr 
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AFFTDAVTT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
: ss. 
) 
Cheryl Hunter, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by the law offices of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Shari Levitin, herein; that she served 
the attached ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT (Case Number 950300087PI, Third District Court, Summit County) upon the 
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Byron J. Benevento 
Matthew M. Durham 
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Sandra 1. Steinvoort 
Kipp & Christian 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Duane R. Smith 
Cameron S. Denning 
Dart Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Joseph J. Huggins 
243 East 400 South 
Metro Place, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Janet A. Goldstein 
Deer Valley Plaza 
P. O. Box 4556 
Park City, Utah 84060 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage pr 
1996. 
day of August, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Suzanne H. Hurst 
10 Exchange Place #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
My Commission Expires 
April 7. 1998 
STATE OF UTAH 
day of August, 1996. 
A^/t"^ 
Residir 
PUBLIC 
'in the State of Utah 
